That's a scary thought. China's online community tends to be urban, young, and male—precisely the people who are most likely to spout jingoistic rants and to castigate any sign of weakness in the regime.
Even so, Beijing isn't wrong to be concerned about what they think: they're also the ones who are most likely to make political trouble in the streets.
The danger is that the regime may be losing sight of how much animosity its actions are creating overseas.
Certainly other nations are envious of how quickly China has bounced back from the global recession, growing at 10.7 percent in the last quarter of 2009.
But that has only increased demands for Beijing to play a more constructive role internationally.
Instead, China appears to be the lone holdout among major powers over levying new sanctions on Iran. At the Copenhagen climate talks the Chinese delegation was widely criticized for playing an unhelpful role, undiplomatically snubbing Obama at one point.
And Beijing continues to resist calls to revalue its currency, sure to become a fierce political issue as job losses mount in the West.
Clearly there has never been more need for understanding between Beijing and Washington.
But America bears some of the blame for the widening disconnect.
The America-watching boom was largely sponsored by grants and stipends from the United States. Americans wanted the Chinese to see the power of democracy. "Some Americans were quite condescending," Wang recalls. "They'd say, 'You don't know much about the U.S. Come and learn from us.' " Still, he and thousands of other Chinese students gladly accepted the invitation. "But that idealism regarding the U.S. has withered away, and meanwhile, everyone's interest in China is growing," Wang says.
Now, he adds, it's easier to find sponsors for research on restive Xinjiang province than to get U.S. funding "to study Oklahoma and what happens there during elections."
While research continues, some in the field worry that the focus has grown too fragmented. To justify their work, many scholars are zeroing in on topics that clearly affect Chinese interests, like international economics, climate-change issues, or energy.
"There may be less understanding of important dynamics inside U.S. society if they don't directly affect bilateral ties," Wang warns.
He recalls his frustration during America's 2008 presidential campaign when he predicted that Barack Obama would win. Some leading Chinese intellectuals were incredulous. "One told me, 'No way! How could a black man win? Jisi, you're being unrealistic.' " Wang says. Skepticism lingered in some high-level circles even after Obama won.
People began predicting his assassination. "I would answer, 'Yes, and so could Bush have been assassinated after his election.' " Little wonder that Beijing hasn't treated Obama with the deference that his fans elsewhere in the world have.
Some of Beijing's new imperiousness may be instinctive—the last time it felt itself the center of the world, under the Ming dynasty, its focus quickly turned inward.
But China's old America hands say it's far too soon to write off America. "If the U.S. is lucky and China makes mistakes, the U.S. could stay [on top]," says Yan Xuetong, the head of Tsinghua University's Institute of International Studies.
Sun Zhe, director of Tsinghua's U.S.-China Relations Center, compares China to the Chinese-born basketball star Yao Ming at 17, "with his body grown up already, but he's just gotten into the NBA, just starting to play ball."
Beijing's new prickliness could be a rookie's immature swagger—or a sign of rough times to come.
© 2010
